Wednesday, August 15, 2012

Point of view notes: Absolute Deviation Poetics and Deleuze


Notes with warning, provisional and uncertain, toward point of view which engage with Deleuze's actual and virtual partly from, Difference and Repetition (cited as DR.)

This is a sketch which maps, with montage alpha channel ghostings of other writers which I can't cite from memory. And, most importantly, this may be wrong.

Absolute Deviation Poetics is actualizing, something of a percept and affect, and yet cannot be perceived and felt according to the limits of common sense ideas of truth. This perhaps entails a theory of point of view which suggests an original poetics. (This is to say, a responsibility to undertake such a task.)

By way of an opening example which is not as such, meaning it cannot operate as an example as analogy would expect; gender, male and female, is not fixed or determined as a category and so is affective as accidental variations which emerge as multiple possibilities. Which is to say an unstable probable fictional world or the world as novel, in both senses of new and as a long complex narrative. Affect here, includes Silvan Tomkins innate affects, one of which is shame as the incomplete reduction of interest. This draws on a claimed neo-Kantian theory of shame provided by Silvan Tomkins. Shame, an incomplete reduction of interest, would at the limit be dx in mathematics. The question is open as to if at this limit interest, is a positive innate affect, as it is with Tomkins, or becomes neutral, as if it were for Tomkins, a neutral innate affect of surprise or at the upper levels, startle.

NOTE: The idea of n sexes in D&G, A Thousand Plateaus, is not an invention but a scientific understanding of gender and sexual reproduction, which is not limited to two sexes but may be one, two, three, four or n sexes, where n is a whole positive number. It is probable and unstable, an accidental outcome. (Citations...)

Deleuze’s actual, which may be said to be a plurality of empirical sensuality, sees the material world as manifestations which, though immanent to it, are not part of it. It is the actualization of virtual, in which an actual and material world can be said to be a novel, written as a prose fiction book. Deleuze speaks of the actual as “an external envelope or a detachable shell” which is “animated by the other repetition” (DR, 289) He also writes; actual is the spatio-temporal realization of virtual structures as an event and also a complex assemblage of actual and virtual.

Such an event is also a novel, yet is outside philosophy and the philosophical virtual as Idea or ideal. With this event, a poetics of the novel is also the actual outside of philosophy. So we have a poetics which is not philosophy although it is already thought and idea and also the novel is itself material or a thing which exists. Bakhtin's chronotope and reading of Dante are also suggested (cite Dialogic Imagination), especially the vertical layers of hell with the lower layers becoming even more cold. Perhaps we are to hit the limit, absolute zero and the stopping of atomic motion. Electrons stuck frozen, collided and crammed flat against neutrons and protons. Absolute stillness? A queer poetics cutting across any common held physical ideas of truth; perhaps gothic.

Space and time are made by difference as “the production of existence occurring in a characteristic space and time” (DR, 211). From this we are to understand Deleuze provides a three part ontology which cannot be separated into three component parts. This is a complex monist structure which if divided changes in nature. Division would end the complex logic of Deleuze's ontology or be something else. Novel narrative and point of view, here Absolute Deviation Poetics, may seem to follow a similar path, albeit different and something else. As to how remains to be considered as does the openness of serial novel narrative. Again, the insistent problem of how to write.

Looking also at Deleuze's discussion of the idea in Kant and dx, which is not derived from x, which to to say, not proven by the striated mathematical proof of dx, suggests a point of view which does not depend on a third person singular point as prescribed and limited as realist fiction. (cite, true story of the novel) This suggests point of view which is free indirect discourse and Bakhtin's polyvocal collage theory of the novel. This could introduce a poetic theory and in so doing a theory which is not philosophy or reliant on philosophical concepts the way Bakhtin's theory of the novel may appear. Again, this remains open to question as to if Bakhtin's theory is really so reliant. (Cite Bakhtin, Dialogic imagination and problems of D's poetics)

Deleuze reads in Spinoza the expression of pure immanence and Spinoza’s search for an ontology in which Being is said equally of all things. But Spinoza, Ethics, in Deleuze’s understanding, cannot realize this by privileging substance over mode. Deleuze sees substance as turning on its modes and such an ontology is constituted as a verb to be. Again, we have an opening onto point of view in narrative which is not, as such, a point of view based on substance, but process itself. What is actualalised fails to form a focus and point in the way a parabolic lens, for example, is said to gain focus on a substance.

 Flux and probability, as being unfocused, may be some way into this idea of point of view. Laminar and turbulent flows which are only approximated as probabilities and as such cannot be reached by any fixed Monadic or determined and limited realist point of view. (There is a break suggested here with what is prescribed as realist fiction. Something which Gore Vidal may be accused of doing? See again true story of the novel... cite)

Following this, Being renders itself  as ideal, for Deleuze virtual. Some appear as a material world through the process of differentiation, “the actualization of virtuality into species and distinguished parts” (DR, 207). Virtual structures are forced to differenciate themselves. (Note the two different spellings.) Deleuze writes “the characteristic of virtuality is to exist in such a way that it is actualized by being differentiated and is forced to differentiate itself, to create its lines of differentiation in order to be actualized.” (Citation from Deleuze's book on Bergson...) The actual does not copy the virtual, and a material thing is not a copy of the Idea. To actualize an Idea is to differ and diverge so “the nature of the virtual is such that, for it, to be actualized is to be differenciated” (DR, 211). Important to note here; virtual comes afterwards as Lacan also demonstrates and hence the need to visit the Ojet petit a. This seems to encourage point of view as diagonal, at least. The flip side of this as the limit of psychoanalysis is affects, according to Andre Green. (...citations needed.)

So, organisms may be biological Ideas and social may be social Ideas, yet these do not resemble their actualizations. To be actual is to differ from virtual. It is here that a novel poetics also opens onto actualization, or to be more poetic, performance. This suggests that a novel narrative performs what it is. It shows in the telling. It is actual. It acts narrative and point of view, in showing and telling. Point of view then makes little if any distinction between telling and showing, other then that which is actual, which is to say needed for narrative performance. (This still leaves open pragmatic questions and decisions. Mimetic strategies can impose themselves as immanent critique, for example, where as telling may take on a minor role.)

As for Spinoza, Deleuze with Spinoza sees expression as a double movement. Spinoza’s substance appears independent of the modes, while the modes are dependent on substance, as though on something other than themselves. (DR, 40) This may be another critical strategy. This may also lead us to Silvan Tomkins affects. Again, we find a need to visit shame as the incomplete reduction of interest and the problem, at the limits of this reduction, of interest being a positive affect or at this limit, almost neutral, yet still having enough of a positive vector and force that we can accept that interest remains at the limits of human activity, which for Kant is culture, still a positive affect. We could also ask if interest as a positive innate affect, instead, gives way to a neutral innate affect of surprise and starle, at the infinite limit of reduction? Is this then Kantian disinterest and have we returned to a Kantian aesthetic? In the probability of flux does this remain one accidental option? A throw of the dice?

We seem to be at some sort of gate which raises the logic of a silicon computer chip, as well. Are we to find that the real logic of a computer chip is outside transcendent hardware and code and electronic navigational devices? Can we still be Romantic when returning to the limits of human endeavour or do we hold out for a future to come. A return to a critical modernism.

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